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MARK TUSHNET*
I.  INTRODUCTION:  THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL  HARDBALL,
WITH SOME EXAMPLES
For the past several years I have been noticing a phenomenon
that seems to me new in my lifetime  as a scholar of constitutional
law.  I call  the phenomenon  constitutional hardball. This Essay
develops  the  idea  that there  is  such  a  practice,  that there  is  a
sense in which it is new, and that its emergence (or re-emergence)
is  interesting  because  it  signals that  political actors  understand
that  they  are  in  a  position  to  put  in  place  a  new  set  of deep
institutional  arrangements  of a sort  I  call  a constitutional  order.'
A shorthand  sketch of constitutional hardball is this: it consists of
political  claims  and  practices-legislative  and  executive
initiatives-that  are without  much question within the bounds of
existing  constitutional  doctrine  and  practice  but  that  are
nonetheless  in  some  tension  with  existing  pre-constitutional
understandings.'  It  is  hardball because  its  practitioners  see
themselves  as  playing  for  keeps  in  a  special  kind  of way;  they
believe the stakes of the political controversy their actions provoke
are quite  high, and that their defeat  and their opponents' victory
would  be  a  serious,  perhaps  permanent  setback  to the  political
positions they hold.3
The  Essay  begins  in  this  Part  with  some  examples  of
constitutional hardball, followed by a description of the practice in
"  Carmack  Waterhouse  Professor  of  Constitutional  Law,  Georgetown
University Law Center.
1.  For  my  discussion  of the idea  of a  constitutional  order,  on  which the
analysis in this Essay builds, see MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER (2003).
2.  By  this  I  mean  the  "go  without  saying" assumptions  that  underpin
working  systems  of constitutional  government.  They  are  hard  to  identify
outside  of times  of  crisis  precisely  because  they  go  without  saying.  (An
alternative  term would be conventions.)  These assumptions  are conceptually
prior  to  the  Constitution  (thus,  "pre"-constitutional),  not  necessarily
temporally prior.
3.  For a  parallel  investigation, dealing  however  with situations  in which
the stakes  are quite substantially higher  than they have  been  in the United
States, see  Jos6  Maria  Maravall,  The Rule of Law as a Political Weapon, in
DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  RULE  OF  LAW  261  (Jos6  Maria  Maravall  &  Adam
Przeworski eds., 2003).The John Marshall  Law Review
more general  terms.  Part II develops  the  connection,  asserted in
this  Part,  between  constitutional  hardball  and  changes  in
fundamental  constitutional  arrangements  or,  in  my  own  terms,
constitutional  orders.  Part  III  then  describes  the  events
surrounding Marbury v.  Madison as an episode  of constitutional
hardball.  Part  IV  offers  further  elaborations  of  the  concept,
emphasizing  in  particular  the  ways  in  which  constitutional
hardball  can  fail  and  defending  the  concept  against  the  charge
that it  does not  in fact single out a practice  that is different from
ordinary  constitutional  politics.  Finally,  Part V  provides  some
modest normative reflections on constitutional hardball.
A.  Some Examples of Constitutional  Hardball
Examples of constitutional hardball may give readers a better
sense of the practices  I have in mind. 4  Perhaps the best example is
the filibuster  mounted by the Senate's  Democrats against  several
judicial nominations  made  by President  George W. Bush in 2002-
03.  The Democrats' actions were clearly within the bounds set by
the  Senate's rules,  and the Constitution  expressly  authorizes the
Senate  to  adopt  rules  to  govern  its  operation.6  Republicans
responded to the filibuster by developing an argument that it was
unconstitutional  because  it  interfered  with  the  ability  of  the
Senate  to  decide,  by  majority  vote,  whether  to  consent  to  a
4.  I  note  at  the  outset  that  I  approach  the  materials  from  a  partisan
stance on the left.  I believe  that my political  position makes me more attuned
to  examples  of hardball  practices  I  see  on  the  right.  The  structure  of my
argument,  though,  strongly  suggests  that  when  one  side  starts  to  play
constitutional  hardball,  the other  side  will join  in.  So,  I  am confident  that
someone who looked at contemporary  politics  from the right would be able to
locate  examples  of  constitutional  hardball  being  played  by  liberals  and
progressives.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  my  argument  suggests  that
conservatives  must  have  started  the  contemporary  game  of constitutional
hardball, although I suspect that it would be quite difficult to identify the first
instance of constitutional  hardball, and  I refrain  from  trying.  For the  same
reason I have  avoided another  possible approach to identifying constitutional
hardball, suggested to me by Vicki Jackson.  Her thought is that constitutional
hardball originates in a sense of unfairness: people who thought they had been
playing  by  the  rules  discover  that  their  opponents  have  changed  tactics  in
ways that put them at a disadvantage.  They then adopt a tit-for-tat strategy
of retaliation.  The  difficulty with this  approach  is that it turns crucially  on
identifying the first departure from prior understandings.  Once constitutional
hardball begins, participants-and observers who will have their own partisan
predispositions-will  disagree  over  that identification  for precisely  the  same
reasons that they engage in constitutional hardball.
5.  The example is better than others precisely because it has a bipartisan
character:  The  actions  on  both  sides  of  the  Senate's  aisle  have  the  key
attributes of constitutional hardball.
6.  U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.  2.  "Each House  may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings".  Id.
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nomination.  I  believe  that argument  to be strained,7  because  it
requires  one  to  distinguish  between  filibusters  of  judicial
nominations  and filibusters  of ordinary  legislation recommended
by the President to Congress pursuant to his duty to do so.8  Still,
there  are  not-implausible  distinctions  available,9  and  some
versions  of arguments  against  the  constitutionality  of a  Senate
rule authorizing filibusters generally are not at all insubstantial."
The  Republicans'  arguments,  then,  were  within  constitutional
bounds as well.
At the  same  time,  some  aspects  of the  Democrats'  and  the
Republicans'  behavior  were  unusual.  The  Democratic  filibusters
were,  if  not  unique,1'  quite  unusual.  We  might  compare  the
nomination filibuster to recess appointments to the federal courts.
The  Constitution  clearly  authorizes  such  appointments,  and
presidential  use of the power was not unusual. 3  But, presidents
have come  to refrain  from using their undoubtedly  constitutional
power to make recess  appointments,  in part out of concern  about
possible  intrusions  on judicial  independence  that  arise  from  the
possibility  that  a  recess  nominee  will  not  receive  a  permanent
7.  It  is  developed  in  Judicial  Nominations,  Filibusters,  and  the
Constitution:  When a Majority is Denied its Right to Consent:  Before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee  on  the  Constitution, 2003  [hereinafter  Eastman's
Testimony]  (statement of John  C.  Eastman, Professor  of Constitutional  Law,
Chapman  University  School  of  Law,  and  Director,  The  Claremont  Institute
Center  for  Constitutional  Jurisprudence  available  at  http'//www.clare
mont.org/static/pdf/eastmantestimony.pdf  (last visited September  3, 2003)).
8.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  "He shall from time to time ....  recommend to
their  Consideration  such  Measures  as  he  shall  judge  necessary  and
expedient".  Id.  (emphasis added).
9.  For example, as Professor Eastman's testimony, supra note 8,  suggests,
the President's power to  nominate judges  implicates a different,  and perhaps
more important, set of separation-of-powers  concerns  than does the power to
recommend legislation.
10.  For  an  overview,  see  Erwin  Chemerinsky  &  Catherine  Fisk,  The
Filibuster,  49 STAN.  L. REV.  181 (1997).  The strongest arguments are against
using a rule authorizing filibusters to insulate that very rule from change by a
majority of the Senate.
11.  Republicans had mounted a filibuster when Lyndon Johnson nominated
Associate Justice  Abe Fortas to succeed Earl Warren  as Chief Justice.  For a
description, see LAURA KALMAN,  ABE FORTAs  355 (1990).  Professor Eastman's
testimony  asserts that the Democratic  filibusters are "even more  problematic
than the one successfully waged against Fortas, because Fortas never received
majority support on a cloture vote."  Eastman's testimony, supra note 8, at 23
n.36.  According  to Kalman, "When [Senate majority leader]  Mansfield  called
for  a vote  on  October  1, only  forty-five  of the  eighty-eight  Senators  present
voted for cloture."  KALMAN, supra at 355.
12.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.  3.  "The President shall have Power to fill up
all Vacancies  that may happen during the Recess of the Senate."  Id.
13.  For  a  discussion,  see  Louis  Fisher,  Recess  Appointments of Federal
Judges, CONG.  RESEARCH  SERV.  (Sept. 5,  2001),  available at httpJ/www.sen
ate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31112.pdf  (last visited Nov.  14, 2003).
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position  unless he or  she curries favor with the president." 4  This
restraint on the use of acknowledged  power might even amount to
a weak pre-constitutional  convention against recess appointments
to  the  courts.  Similarly,  one  might  say,  that  the  Senate  had
adopted  a  pre-constitutional  convention  against  using  the
filibuster  on  judicial  nominations  since  the  Fortas  nomination.
The  Democrats'  filibuster  is  then  a  repudiation  of a settled  pre-
constitutional understanding.
The  Republican  response is similar, though  on a lower level.
Some  Republicans  suggested  that were  the  filibusters  to persist
they  would  support  litigation  aimed  at  establishing  the
unconstitutionality  of the practice. 5  What was unusual about this
threat  is  that  Senators  typically  have  been  quite  jealous  about
refraining  from  submitting  intra-house  disputes  to  judicial
supervision.  The  Senate  leadership  has  often  filed  papers
asserting  that  individual  Senators  lack  standing  to  challenge
Senate  procedures,  for  example.  The  preferred  course-perhaps,
again,  amounting  to  a  pre-constitutional  convention-is  for  the
Senate to resolve these internal disputes internally."
I believe that constitutional hardball is more prevalent than a
single  example  indicates.  The  successful  effort  in  Colorado,  and
the parallel one in Texas, to revisit districting decisions made after
the  2000  census  is  similar  in  structure.  Legislatures  have  an
undoubted right to alter district lines as often as they want.  The
case for doing so in Colorado  and Texas was not frivolous;  in each
state  the  first  set  of  districts  was  devised  not  by  an  elected
legislature  but  by  a  court  acting  after  the  state legislature  had
failed  to  act.7  Still,  in  each  round of districting  since  the  1970s
14.  The practice of recess appointments to Article III courts was suspended
for about twenty years, then was revived  by President Jimmy Carter in  1980
(a recess  appointment  of a district judge,  whose name was  not resubmitted
when  the  appointment  expired),  and,  after  another  twenty-year  period,  by
President  William  Clinton  in  2000  (a recess  appointment  of Roger  Gregory,
who  was  subsequently  renominated  by  President  George  W.  Bush  and
confirmed by the Senate).  Id.  at 19-24.
15.  For  a  copy  of  the  complaint  that  was  filed  by  Judicial  Watch,  see
http://www.judicialwatch.org/complaint_051403.shtml  (last  visited  Nov.  12,
2003).
16.  The Republicans' threat to support litigation was a milder "repudiation"
of the pre-constitutional  understanding than the Democrats' filibuster because
it  was-at  least  to  the  present-only  a  threat.  President  Bush's  recess
appointment  of the filibustered nominee Charles  Pickering would seem to be
stronger  repudiation  of the possible  (weak) pre-constitutional  understanding
limiting the use of recess appointment.
17.  For  Colorado,  see  T.R.  Reid,  Texans  Back  Colorado Democrats  in
Redistricting Case, THE  WASH.  POST,  Sept.  9,  2003,  at  A2.  "The  state
legislature,  divided between the two parties, could not settle on a new district
plan in  time for  the  2002 election,  so a state  court  drew  the map." Id.  For
Texas,  see  Chris  Cilizza, Redistricting Two-Step  to  Resume Monday,  ROLL
CALL,  Sept. 11,  2003.  "After Texas legislators deadlocked in their attempts to
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legislators have generally taken the first set of districts to be fixed
until the next census or until they were ordered to draw a new set
of districts  by a  court.  The  Republican  actions  in  Colorado  and
Texas  are  constitutional  hardball  because  they  are  inconsistent
with  what  seemed  to  be  a  settled  pre-constitutional
understanding."  The  Democrats'  response  in  Texas-absenting
themselves  from  the  legislature  and  the state-was  a  defensive
form  of  constitutional  hardball,  inconsistent  with  what  most
people  would  think  were  the  obligations  of  elected
representatives. 9
A final  example  is the  impeachment  of President  Clinton. °
Here  too there  was at least substantial constitutional support for
the proposition  that the House  of Representatives  had the power
to impeach  Clinton for what its members  concluded he had done.2"
Of course,  impeachment,  particularly  of a  president,  is  serious
business.  Prior to the Clinton impeachment, House members filed
papers  aimed  at  instituting  impeachment  proceedings  of  other
redraw the lines in 2001, a federal court adopted a plan that upheld the status
quo in the 2002 elections."  Id.
18.  Supplementing the hardball  of the  districting efforts themselves  is the
suggestion by Representative  Tom DeLay that the failure to enact new district
lines  is  itself  a  constitutional  violation,  of  the  asserted  constitutional
requirement  that district  lines  be  drawn by  legislatures  whenever  possible.
For DeLay's statement, see Fox News Sunday, (Fox television broadcast,  Aug.
17,  2003) stating "We're  supposed to, by Constitution,  apportion or redistrict
every  10 years." Id.
19.  Although  I  would  qualify  this a  bit by noting  that the  obligations  of
representatives  arise  out  of a  duty  to constituents  to  consider  the  range  of
issues  that  legislatures deal  with, whereas  the  Democrats  left  the  state  to
avoid  sitting  in  a  special  legislative  session  dealing  only  with  the  issue  of
apportionment.
20.  Robert  Reich uses  the  examples  of impeachment,  some aspects  of the
2000 Florida election controversy, and the California recall election to support
his argument that the United States has begun  to experience what he calls  a
permanent election  (as distinguished  from a permanent election  campaign), in
which  the  outcomes  reached  on  Election  Day  are  not  taken  to  settle  the
election  itself.  Robert  B.  Reich,  The  Permanent Election, THE  AMERICAN
PROSPECT,  Sept.  1,  2003  available  at  http://www.prospect.org
/printlV14/8/reich-r.html (last visited Nov.  14, 2003).  Reich's idea is similar to
mine,  but  it  probably  has  a  broader  reach  than  the  idea  of  constitutional
hardball.
21.  They  could reasonably have  believed that  his false  statements  were  a
high  crime  or  misdemeanor  according  to  accepted  interpretations  of those
terms (as referring  to  serious criminal misconduct  or to misconduct, whether
or not amounting to a serious crime, that cast doubt on the president's fitness
to continue in office),  or that the House had the power to impeach a president
whenever  it judged,  according  to whatever  standards  it  chose,  that he had
committed  a  high  crime  or  misdemeanor  (a  position  associated  with  then-
Representative  Gerald Ford,  in remarks  made  in  1970,  quoted  in GEOFFREY
STONE  ET  AL.,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAw  362  (4th  ed.  2001)  ("an  impeachable
offense is whatever a majority of the House  of Representatives  considers  it to
be at a given moment in history")).
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presidents." 2   Those  attempts  were  never  pursued  with  any
seriousness.  One  can  combine  that fact  with  the evidence  from
impeachments  of  federal  judges  to  identify  yet  another  pre-
constitutional understanding: the House of Representatives  should
not  aggressively  carry out  an  impeachment  inquiry unless,  from
the  outset, there is a reasonable  probability  that the inquiry will
result  in  the  target's  removal  from  office.  The  Clinton
impeachment was inconsistent with that understanding.
Constitutional  hardball  has  another  characteristic.  The
stakes  are  quite  high when  politicians  play  it.  The  Democrats'
filibusters  are  designed  in  the  first  instance  to  prevent  the
President  from  transforming  the  federal  circuit  courts  by
appointing  a large number of judges  whom the Democrats regard
as  far  too  conservative  for the  nation's  good.'  The  Republicans'
districting  efforts  are  designed  to  increase  the  number  of seats
that Republican  candidates  are likely  to win,  thereby  enhancing
the likelihood that Republicans  will retain control of the House of
Representatives  through  the  next  census  and  ensuing
redistricting.  The case  of the Clinton impeachment  is a bit more
complicated.  Then-Vice  President  Al  Gore  would  have  replaced
Clinton  as  president  had  the  impeachment  been  followed  by  a
conviction.  There  would have been  no change in partisan control
of the  executive  branch.  Still, the  Republican  leadership  in the
House  of Representatives  might  reasonably  have  believed  that
Clinton's  impeachment  would  substantially  weaken  the  political
position  of the  White  House's  occupant,  whether  that person  be
Clinton or Gore. 4
I have described constitutional hardball as a strategy rational
politicians adopt."  It comes in an offensive form, when politicians
22.  For example, such papers were filed in connection  with the Iran-contra
affair.  See  Jonathan  Turley,  Senate  Trials  and  Factional  Disputes:
Impeachment  as  a  Madisonian Device,  49  DUKE  L.J.  1,  77  n.366  (1999)
(describing a  resolution  on impeachment  that was  filed  and referred  to the
Judiciary Committee, which took no further action).
23.  Although  I have no direct evidence  of this, I believe that the filibusters
are  aimed-perhaps  more  importantly-at  deterring  the  president  from
nominating  an  equally  conservative  person  for  a  vacancy  on  the  Supreme
Court, should one appear prior to the 2004 elections.
24.  For additional discussion of the Clinton impeachment, see infra note 72.
25.  Louis Michael Seidman has suggested  to me  that there  is another  form
of  constitutional  hardball,  which  he  believes  is  more  important.  In  the
alternative  version,  politicians  play  constitutional  hardball  out  of  an
essentially irrational  belief that their political opponents  are  so deeply wrong
that their continuation in office, or the possibility of their becoming dominant,
is a threat to everything for which the nation stands.  Seidman  points to the
impeachment example, where the Republicans in the House  of Representative
must have  known  that they had  no chance  of removing Clinton  from  office
(and that, if they did, they would get Al Gore in his place).  My argument, that
the  House Republicans  had  an eye  on the 2000  presidential elections,  seems
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from  a  minority party  see  the  opportunity  open  for  a  (possible)
permanent  transformation  of their status.  Such  politicians play
constitutional  hardball to change their status.  It also comes  in a
defensive  form,  when  politicians  in  a  dominant  party  see  the
possibility  that they  may be permanently  displaced  from  power.
These  politicians  play  constitutional  hardball  to  preserve  their
status.
B.  Constitutional  Hardball  and Partisan  Entrenchment
The  high-stakes  characteristic  of  constitutional  hardball
shows  that  hardball  is  an  element  of  the  more  general
phenomenon  Jack  Balkin  and  Sanford  Levinson  identified  as
partisan entrenchment. 6  According to Balkin and Levinson, large-
scale changes  in deep institutional arrangements  occur through a
process of partisan entrenchment.
Balkin  and  Levinson  focus  on partisan entrenchment  in the
courts.  "When  a party  wins  the  White  House,  it  can  stock  the
federal  judiciary  with  members  of  its  own  party,  assuming  a
relatively acquiescent Senate.""  In doing so, the president extends
his party's policy positions, and its positions  on the meaning of the
Constitution, over a much longer period than his own presidency.
And,  once  the  judges  are  in  place,  "they  start  to  change  the
understandings  of the  Constitution that appear  in positive law." 2"
For  Balkin  and  Levinson,  partisan  entrenchment  means  that
"[p]arties who control the presidency install jurists of their liking-
given whatever counterweight the Senate provides." 9
The  process  of partisan entrenchment  should,  I  believe,  be
understood  more  broadly  than  in  Balkin  and  Levinson's  initial
presentation."  The  full  process  of  partisan  entrenchment  has
strained  to  him.  Seidman  and  I  agree  that  both  forms  of  constitutional
hardball might well occur.
26.  Jack M.  Balkin & Sanford Levinson,  Understanding  the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv.  1045 (2001).
27.  Id. at 1067.
28.  Id.
29.  Id. at 1076.
30.  Agreeing as  I do  with much of Balkin  and Levinson's  approach,  I may
seem  a  bit  churlish  in  noting  that,  despite  their  acknowledgement  that
constitutional  understandings  develop  outside  the  courts,  their  analysis  is
focused  almost  exclusively  on  the  courts  as  locations  for  constitutional
transformation.  Perhaps it has that focus  because Balkin  and  Levinson see
Bush  v.  Gore  as  a  much  more  important  part  of  the  story  of  partisan
entrenchment  than  I  do,  and  so  minimize  the  importance  of the  games  of
constitutional hardball that were being played elsewhere.  For  another work
acknowledging the value of Balkin and Levinson's work while criticizing it for
some  omissions,  see  Howard  Gillman,  Constitutional Law  as  Partisan
Entrenchment: The Political  Origins of Liberal Judicial  Activism (unpublished
paper  in  author's  possession)  available  at  http://www.yale
.edu/law/ltw/papers/Hw-gillman.pdf (last visited Nov.  14, 2003).
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several  stages,  in which  control  of the courts is only  one phase.31
First, proponents  of a particular set of arrangements gain  control
over  one  component  of  the  government. 32  They  then  use  that
control  to devise mechanisms  that ensure their continued  control
of that  component.  For  example,  they  might  develop  ways  of
implementing  civil  service  regulations,  intended  to  eliminate
partisan  influence  on  the  lower  levels  of  the  executive
bureaucracy,  so that lower-level bureaucrats are in fact committed
to a particular  partisan program.'  Or, perhaps  more important,
they set their substantive legislative  or executive agenda to attract
strong  support  from  some,  and  to  demobilize  their  opponents.'
Further, those who  control  one  component  of the government try
to leverage  that control  into taking  control of other  components.
Balkin and Levinson focus in particular on the ability of a partisan
coalition  that  takes  narrow  control  of  the  Senate  and  the
presidency to gain much more extensive control over the judiciary,
for a long term. 3"
31.  A  signal  of the  need for  a  more  expansive  view  of the process  is  the
phrase  assuming a  relatively acquiescent Senate  in  Balkin  and Levinson's
account  of partisan  entrenchment  in  the courts.  Balkin & Levinson, supra
note 26, at 1067.  The Democratic filibuster shows that we need not make such
an assumption, even when the same party as the presidency  formally controls
the  Senate.  Compare with  Balkin  &  Levinson,  supra  note  26,  at  1083
(describing Bush v.  Gore as  a case in which "five members of the Court us [ed]
their powers  of judicial review to entrench their party in the Presidency, and
thus, in effect, in the judiciary as well, because of the President's appointments
power.") (emphasis added).
32.  My presentation contrasts with Balkin  and Levinson's in part because I
treat the courts as simply one of several components of the political system, all
of which can play the leading role in partisan entrenchment.
It is perfectly normal for Presidents to entrench members  of their party
in  the judiciary  as  a  means  of shaping  constitutional  interpretation.
That  is the way  most constitutional  change  occurs.  It is  quite another
matter for  members  of the  federal judiciary to  select  a president  who
will entrench like-minded colleagues in the judiciary.
Id. at  1083.
I  note  as  well  that  Balkin  and  Levinson  properly  emphasize  the
temporal  extent  of  entrenchment.  The  sense  in  which  Bush  v.  Gore
"entrenched" a Republican president is quite different from the sense in which
a president entrenches his party's supporters in the courts.
33.  The techniques  are familiar:  exile  to undesirable  postings, assignment
to unrewarding  tasks,  and  unacknowledged  political screening  of applicants
for appointment and promotion.
34.  An  example  might  be  development  of  legislative  restrictions  on  the
kinds of cases  that lawyers  supported by the Legal Services  Corporation  can
bring,  sometimes described  as one  of several  means of "defunding  the  left."
For  the  Supreme  Court's  consideration  of  a  very  small  portion  of  those
restrictions, see Legal Services Corp. v.  Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
35.  And,  of course,  the  process  ofi partisan  entrenchment  might continue
were  the judiciary  then  to  interpret  the  Constitution  in  ways  that  further
entrenched  the partisans  in the presidency  and Senate who put the judges in
place.
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The stakes  are high when politicians  play political  hardball,
that is, because the politicians believe that the winners might end
up  with  permanent  control  (meaning,  control  for  the  full  time-
horizon  of  today's  politicians)  of  the  entire  government.  The
winner  of constitutional  hardball takes everything,  and the loser
loses  everything.  The  next  Part  of  this  Essay  examines  the
possibility  that this  characteristic  of constitutional  hardball  can
explain its emergence  in particular  political conjunctures (and its
absence in others).
II.  ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL
This Part describes  various aspects of constitutional hardball
in  more  detail.  I  begin  by  expanding  the  argument  that
constitutional  hardball  is  associated  with  changes  from  one
constitutional  order  to  another.  I  do  so  by  examining  the way
constitutional hardball can be  played with respect to institutional
arrangements  and  with  respect  to  substantive  principles.  The
Part  concludes  by  describing  how  the  courts  can  play
constitutional hardball.
A.  Constitutional  Hardball  and Institutional  Arrangements
The characteristics  of constitutional hardball help explain its
emergence.  Consider,  first, the fact that hardball  arguments  are
not frivolous.  The important point here is that this characteristic
in  itself  cannot  possibly  identify  an  interesting  phenomenon.
Congress  enacts  constitutionally  questionable  legislation  all  the
time,  for  which  there  are  nonetheless  non-frivolous  arguments
supporting constitutionality. 6  When Congress does so, it is acting
in  a  constitutionally  ordinary  way:  enacting  unconstitutional
statutes that supporters believe to be constitutional.
The  term  ordinary  signals  what  we  need  to  distinguish
constitutional  hardball,  because  it  evokes  Bruce  Ackerman's
distinction between ordinary politics and constitutional moments."
36.  One obvious recent  example is the federal  flag burning statute enacted
in  the  wake  of  Texas  v.  Johnson,  491  U.S.  397  (1989),  and  held
unconstitutional  in United States v. Eichmann, 486 U.S. 310 (1990).  I believe
that  the Court's  decisions  were  compelled  by  all  coherent  First Amendment
theories,  and that the federal  statute was indistinguishable  in  principle from
the state one earlier held unconstitutional.  Even so, four justices would have
upheld the federal statute  against constitutional  attack.  Or, to take another
example,  the Communications  Decency Act, held  unconstitutional by a Court
that  was unanimous  on  the  central  issues  in  Reno  v.  ACLU,  521  U.S.  844
(1997),  strikes  me as,  again,  unconstitutional  under  any reasonable  general
First Amendment  theory,  but I  can imagine  developing  a narrowly  defined
exception to standard theory for the communications covered by the Act.
37.  One  need not  accept  Ackerman's  analysis  in all  its glory  (I  do  not) to
acknowledge that he has identified something  important in  our constitutional
practices by distinguishing between the ordinary and the extraordinary.
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For present purposes, what matters in Ackerman's  account  is his
description  of U.S.  constitutional  history  as  consisting  of long
periods  of ordinary  politics  separated  by shorter  periods,  which
Ackerman calls constitutional  moments.  On the descriptive level,
the nation's fundamental institutional arrangements-the  relations
between  President  and  Congress,  the  mechanisms  by  which
politicians organize  support among the public,  and the principles
that politicians  take  to  guide  the  development  of public  policy-
differ after  a constitutional  moment has passed.  So, for example,
interest groups  played one role in national politics before the New
Deal,  a  different  one  after  the  New  Deal  constitutional
transformation was completed.38
My  suggestion  is  that  constitutional  hardball  is  the  way
constitutional  law  is  practiced  distinctively  during  periods  of
constitutional  transformation. 9  I  do  not mean  to imply that  it  is
the only way constitutional  law is practiced  during such periods.
Precisely  because  such  periods  can  be  extended,  a  great  deal  of
ordinary legislation  will be enacted  during each  one,  and some  of
that legislation will be subject to ordinary constitutional challenge.
Rather,  I  suggest,  constitutional  hardball  singles  out
constitutional  practices  associated  with  constitutional
transformation.  One  important  implication  follows  from  this
suggestion:  one  should  not  be  able  to  observe  episodes  of
constitutional hardball during periods of ordinary politics. 4 0
Here  the  relevance  of  the  second  characteristic  of
constitutional hardball becomes apparent.  One way to distinguish
periods of ordinary politics from  periods of transformation  is that
during the former pre-constitutional understandings  are taken for
granted,  whereas  during  the  latter  such  understandings  are
brought  into  question.  The  idea  is  that  the  institutional
arrangements  characteristic  of a  particular  constitutional  order-
characteristic,  that is, of each specific period  of ordinary  politics-
are  the  presuppositions  accepted  by  all  politically  significant
actors  in  that period,  whereas  the whole  point  of constitutional
transformation  is  to  alter  the  previously  taken-for-granted
institutional  arrangements.  Of  course  the  proponents  of
transformation  are  going  to  place  pre-constitutional
understandings  in  question,  because  they  want  to  replace  those
38.  For my account of the differences,  see TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 12.
39.  My primary  disagreement with Ackerman  is that he believes (for good
reasons  within his  own  project) that  constitutional  moments  must  occur  in
relatively  compressed  time  frames  (as the  term moments suggests),  while  I
believe  that  constitutional  transformations  can  occur  over  substantially
extended periods.  For a discussion of this disagreement, see id. at 3.
40.  For  a discussion,  see infra teXt. accompanying  notes  82-85.  To  adopt
scientific terminology that I think inappropriate for this subject, one might say
that finding constitutional  hardball during periods  of ordinary politics would
refute the hypothesis I am suggesting.
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understandings  with  others.  A  crude  example,  far  more  crude
than  a  full  analysis  would  be:  prior  to  the  New  Deal,  Congress
initiated  legislation  subject  to  modest  review  by  the  President,
whereas  after  the  New  Deal  the  President  initiated  legislation
subject  to  modest  review  by  Congress.  And,  during  the
transformative period when Franklin D. Roosevelt was attempting
to  construct  a  new  constitutional  order,  his  efforts  to  seize  the
legislative  initiative  were  understood  to be  challenges  to settled
pre-constitutional  understandings  about  the  relation  between
President and Congress-and, as such, revolutionary.
The  association  between  constitutional  hardball  and
constitutional  transformation  explains,  finally,  the  fact that the
stakes  are  high  when  a  game  of  constitutional  hardball  is
underway.  The  stakes  are high  because  those who  benefit  from
the  institutional  arrangements  in  place,  and  challenged  by
proponents  of  dramatically  different  institutional  arrangements,
reasonably  fear that they will permanently lose political  power  if
new  institutional  arrangements  are  put in  place.  After  all, the
proponents  of new arrangements  are politicians  seeking power by
offering  their  vision  of  the  public  good  to  the  public  for
consideration  and  adoption.  Of  course  the  politicians  holding
power  during one  period  of ordinary  politics  are afraid that they
will lose power if new institutional arrangements  are put in place,
because the people who seek to construct those new arrangements
are  their  opponents  in  ordinary  politics  who  have  found
themselves unable to prevail under the existing arrangements.
So  far  my  exposition  of  constitutional  hardball  has
emphasized  proposals for departing from settled pre-constitutional
understandings  about  institutional  arrangements  themselves.
The  relation  between  constitutional  hardball  and  constitutional
transformation  should be apparent  in that context.  Only slightly
different  are  the  examples  I  used  to  illustrate  the  idea  of
constitutional  hardball.  There constitutional  hardball  is directed
at  settled  processes for  adopting  public  policy.  Proponents  of
constitutional  transformation  play  constitutional  hardball  when
they try to displace settled processes with ones that would make it
easier for them to put in place the new institutional arrangements
they favor.
Consider  some  examples  used  earlier  in  this  Essay.
Revisiting congressional districting to enhance the probability that
one  party  will  gain  a  more  stable  majority  in  the  House  of
Representatives  is this  kind of constitutional  hardball.  So  too  is
the  very  term  entrenchment used  by  Balkin  and  Levinson.  It
shows  that  the  goal  partisans  seek  is  control  over  substantive
policy  during  the extended  period  of ordinary  politics  they  hope
will follow once their control is entrenched.
The  example  Balkin  and  Levinson  use-using  narrow
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majorities  to  gain  control  over  the  judiciary-is  a  bit  more
complex.  I  believe  that  its  structure  is  two-fold.  First,  an
entrenched judiciary is in a position to insulate from constitutional
challenge  partisan  victories  narrowly  won  on  substantive
legislation.  As  we  will  see,  such  substantive  legislation  might
itself  form  the  platform  for  extending  partisan  control  in  the
legislature.  Second, an entrenched judiciary might be in a position
to secure victories that a partisan coalition is unable to achieve  in
the legislature.4  The classic  example  of this phenomenon  is the
mutually  reinforcing  role  of  Congress  and  the  Supreme  Court
during the Second  Reconstruction  of the  1960s.  The  courts acted
to assist the civil rights movement at points where, for reasons the
adherents  of  the  Democratic  majority  believed  entirely
contingent,4  Congress was unable to act.
B.  Constitutional  Hardball  and Substantive Principles
The  example  of  the  Second  Reconstruction  introduces  an
important aspect  of constitutional  hardball that my exposition  so
far has  failed to discuss.  That aspect is the use  of constitutional
hardball  on  matters  of  substance  rather  than  matters  of
institutional  arrangements  or  matters  of  the  policy-making
process.
Constitutional  orders  combine  enduring  institutional
arrangements with principles  of public policy that guide decision-
makers as they operate within those institutions.  So, for example,
a  president  will  propose  new  statutes  that  implement  the
constitutional  order's principles,'  members  of Congress  will do so
as well,44  and  the courts  will  uphold  statutes that  are consistent
with the order's principles and invalidate those that are not.4'
41.  Obviously, its ability to do so depends importantly on the constitutional
theory  of judicial  power  associated  with  the  constitutional  understandings
held  by  the  proponents  of constitutional  transformation.  More  specifically,
this  mechanism  of partisan  entrenchment  will  be  unavailable  to  those  who
propose  to  entrench  institutional  arrangements  that  minimize  the  role  of
courts  in  policy-making  (unless,  as  may  be  possible,  their  principles
distinguish between the judicial  role during the period of transition  and that
role during the ensuing period of ordinary politics).
42.  That is,  the difficulty of overcoming a filibuster conducted by a minority
in the Senate.
43.  Where,  that  is,  one  of  the  constitutional  order's  institutional
arrangements gives the president a large role in initiating public policy.
44.  And  may  reject  presidential  proposals  they  believe  to be  inconsistent
with the order's guiding principles.
45.  This accounts for the widely  noted phenomenon that most of what the
Supreme  Court  does  is to invalidate  "old"  statutes-those  enacted before  the
current constitutional  order came into being-or statutes that are "outliers," in
force  only  in  states  or  localities  that  have  not  (yet) been  touched  by  the
constitutional transformation  that led other states to take similar statutes off
the books.
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Political  actors  can  play  constitutional  hardball  with
substantive  principles.  Proponents  of  a  constitutional
transformation will propose legislation that pushes the envelope  of
existing constitutional  doctrine.  The proposed statutes will not be
obviously  unconstitutional,"  because  constitutional  hardball
consists  of actions  that  are  plausibly  defensible  under  existing
constitutional doctrine.  But, they will signal that their proponents
have  a substantially  different understanding  of government's role
than  had  seemed  settled.  And,  importantly,  the  proposals,  if
enacted,  might have the  effect of enhancing the political strength
of the coalition seeking to change the constitutional order.
The New  Deal provides good examples  of how  political actors
can play constitutional hardball on substantive matters, the Great
Society  other  examples  that  are  a  bit  less  effective.  The  New
Deal's labor legislation was  questionable  under existing doctrine.
The  Supreme  Court invalidated  the wage-and-hour  provisions  of
the Bituminous  Coal Conservation  Act of 1935 in Carter v.  Carter
Coal Co.,4"  holding  that  Congress  lacked  the  power  under  the
Commerce  Clause  to  regulate  such  "local"  economic  activities.
That holding clearly threatened the National Labor Relations Act,
the centerpiece of New Deal labor legislation,  which established  a
structure for regulating labor relations that progressives and labor
unions  had  been  seeking  for  years.  As  Peter  Irons  and  Barry
Cushman  have  shown,  the  NLRA  was  not  patently
unconstitutional  under  existing  doctrine.8  Yet,  the  lawyers
working  on  the  statute  and  the  cases  that  arose  after  its
enactment  knew  that  they  had  their  work  cut  out  for  them,
because  they  knew  that the  statute pushed  aggressively  against
the constitutional limits the Court had established.
Further, the  NLRA rested  on  assumptions about the  role  of
government  in labor relations that differed  substantially from the
assumptions  previously held.  The NLRA  substituted government
supervision  of  bargaining  between  employers  and  employees,
pursuant  to legislatively specified procedures  and subject to some
legislatively  specified  constraints  on  tactics,  for  bargaining-
whether  individual  or  collective  - regulated  solely  by  the
participants'  power  in  the  marketplace,  subject  to  standard
common  law  rules  regarding  force  and  fraud.  And,  finally,  the
NLRA was likely to extend the Democratic party's political hold  in
two ways.  Labor unions whose  organizing task was eased  by the
NLRA could be expected to reward the Democratic party by giving
46.  Although they might be quite questionable.
47.  298 U.S. 238 (1936).
48.  BARRY CUSHMAN,  RETHINKING  THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL  REVOLUTION  (1998);  PETER  H.  IRONS,  THE NEW DEAL
LAWYERS (1982).
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it  political  support.49  And, progressives  who  favored  professional
management  of society  could be expected  to do  the same, finding
the  NLRA's  regulatory  principles  consonant  with  their
professionalist presuppositions.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides a parallel,  albeit less
crisp,  example."  The  political  effects  of the  Act,  its  proponents
believed,  would  benefit  the  Democratic  party  by  offsetting  the
party's  losses  in  the  South  due  to its  support  of the  civil  rights
movement.  The Act displaced state control over voting procedures,
substituting regulation by federal  bureaucrats  in the Department
of Justice through  the Act's "preclearance"  mechanism.  The  Act
challenged  pre-constitutional  understandings  about  "states'
rights."  The  pre-constitutional  understanding  that  states  had
such  rights  had,  for  all  practical  purposes,  disappeared  when
Congress  acted  to  regulate  the  national  economy,  but  they
remained  embedded  with respect  to  much  else that  states  did.5'
Those  pre-constitutional  understandings  were  reflected  in
constitutional  doctrine  that  suggested  the  impropriety  of
congressional  action  displacing  the  mechanisms  of  state
government  even as Congress's power to displace the substance of
what those governments did was clearly established. 2
The Supreme Court, of course, upheld the constitutionality of
the  NLRAu  and  the  Voting  Rights  Act.54  In  doing  so,  it  acted
pursuant to yet another principle guiding the New Deal and Great
Society's  constitutional  order,  one  that  blended  institutional
arrangements with matters of substance.  That principle was that
the  courts  and  the  political  branches  should  be  collaborators  in
developing  public  policy.5'  This  principle  simply  states  what
49.  It is  worth  emphasizing  that prior  to the  New  Deal members  of the
skilled trades  who were organized into  unions provided significant support to
Republican  candidates.  See  JOSEPH  G.  RAYBACK,  A HISTORY  OF  AMERICAN
LABOR 298-99 (1966).
50.  The  example  is less crisp because  the Great  Society was  an extension
rather than a repudiation of the New Deal.
51.  As late as  1961,  Herbert Wechsler continued  to defend the proposition
that  state  regulation  was  the  norm  in  our  constitutional  system,  federal
regulation  the  exception.  See  HERBERT  WECHSLER,  PRINCIPLES,  POLITICS,
AND  FUNDAMENTAL  LAW  52  (1961)  ("National  action  has ...  always  been
regarded  as  exceptional  in  our  polity ...  [T]hose  who  would  advocate  its
exercise must ...  answer the preliminary  question why the matter should not
be left to the states.") (reprinting an article originally published in 1954).
52.  For a description of the doctrines that could be called upon to challenge
aspects  of the Voting Rights  Act, see South Carolina  v.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 358-62  (1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
53.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
55.  For a more extensive discussion,  see Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court
and the National Political Order: Collaboration and Confrontation, in THE
SUPREME  COURT  AND  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT  (Ronald  Kahn  &
Ken Kersch eds., forthcoming).
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happens  once  a  constitutional  order  is  in  place:  all  of  the
government's institutions operate harmoniously, implementing the
order's  characteristic  substantive  principles  and  dividing  labor
according  to  the  order's  characteristic  institutional
56 arrangements.
C.  The Courts in Constitutional  Hardball
The  flip-side  of collaboration  during  constitutional  orders  is
conflict during the transition between  one constitutional order and
another.  That possibility has been  implicit in my  account  so far.
The  very  fact  that  the  proposals  offered  by  proponents  of
constitutional  transformation  are  constitutionally  questionable
implies that there is a decent chance that the courts will find them
unconstitutional  if  enacted.  But, an  upsurge  of conflict  suggests
more than  substantive  disagreement.  It  may  be  the  distinctive
way in which  the courts  play constitutional  hardball.  Again, we
have  to  figure  out  some  way  to  distinguish  between  ordinary
constitutional  invalidations,  of  a  sort  that  will  occur  during
periods  when  a  constitutional  order  is  stable,  and  invalidations
that indicate  deeper, potentially transformative  conflicts.
I  offer  a  suggestion  for  such  a  method  of  distinguishing,
qualified  by  the  observation  that  it  may  reflect  both  a
preoccupation with recent events,  and my view that we have been
in  an  extended  period  of  constitutional  transformation.  The
suggestion is that we  can identify judicial constitutional hardball
by  observing the  courts  expressly  denying that the  Constitution
imposes an obligation of collaboration on them.  That denial might
occur  in judicial  rhetoric  or  in  constitutional  doctrine.  The  first
possibility is suggested  by the argument captured  in the  titles of
two recent  articles  by  Ruth  Colker  and her  co-authors:  "Dissing
Congress" and "Dissing States.""  The  second is suggested  by the
Supreme Court's recent decisions on the scope of Congress's  power
to  enforce  Section  One  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.
Particularly  telling  is  the  tension  between  Justice  Anthony
Kennedy's  observation  that  Congress  has  "the  duty  to make  its
own  informed  judgment  on  the  meaning  and  force  of  the
Constitution," although that duty arises only when "Congress acts
within  its sphere of power and responsibilities,"'  and the holding
of the case in which he made that observation, which was that the
56.  In my view, a system of more or less  permanently divided government
can  be  a  harmoniously  operating  constitutional  order,  when  the  parties
controlling  the  different  branches  agree  to  keep  their disagreements  within
understood bounds, and accept that each will win only small victories.
57.  Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH.  L. REV.  80
(2001);  Ruth  Colker & Kevin  M.  Scott,  Dissing States: Invalidation of State
Action During  the Rehnquist  Era, 88 VA. L. REV.  1301  (2002).
58.  City of Boerne v. Flores,  521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
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Supreme  Court  would  decide  whether  Congress  had  discharged
that responsibility in a manner conforming to the Constitution.  As
Reva  Siegel  and  Robert  Post  have forcefully  argued,  the  Court's
decisions  are best understood  precisely  as articulating  a doctrine
denying  that  collaboration  between  the  courts  and  the  political
branches  is  a  constitutionally  mandated  mechanism  for
elaborating the Constitution's meaning."
III.  MARBURY V.  MADISON  AS CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL
Marbury v.  Madison can  be  understood  as  one  event  in  a
longer  episode  of  constitutional  hardball,  with  one  important
qualification that I mention at the outset.  Constitutional hardball
involves  practices  and  arguments  that  are  inconsistent  with
settled  pre-constitutional  understandings.  But,  the  U.S.
Constitution  was  still  young  in  1801.  Pre-constitutional
understandings  were  not  settled  at  all,  and  indeed  the  longer
episode  of which  Marbury was  part  might  be  understood  as  a
conflict  over  what  the  nation's  first  pre-constitutional
understandings  were  to  be-particularly,  whether  our
constitutional  arrangements  should  be  predicated  on  the
assumption  that political  conflict  on the  national  level would  be
conducted  through political parties that united factions in various
states around a  common  program.  It is not inconsistent with the
general  idea of constitutional  hardball to modify my specification
of  its  characteristics  to  include  the  possibility  that  the  conflict
would  be,  not  inconsistent  with,  but  about  pre-constitutional
understandings.  Still, the modification seems  to me ad hoc, and I
prefer  simply  to  note  the  difference  between  Marbury's context
and  the  other  examples  of  constitutional  hardball  I  have
provided."°
As  Sanford Levinson  has lamented, basic  law school  courses
in  constitutional  law  often  fail  to  set  Marbury  in  its  larger
context.61  That  context  begins  with  the  emergence  of national
political  parties  in  the  1790s,  quite  contrary  to  the  Framers'
expectations  about how national  politics would be organized.  The
59.  Robert  C.  Post  &  Reva  B.  Siegel,  Equal Protection by  Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,  110  YALE  L.J. 441
(2000);  Robert C.  Post & Reva  B.  Siegel, Protecting  the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric  Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78  IND.  L.J.  1  (2003);
Robert  C.  Post  & Reva  B.  Siegel,  Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
112 YALE L.J. 1943  (2003).
60.  Of course, were  others  to identify  additional examples  of conflicts  over
pre-constitutional  understandings,  I  would  happily  modify my description  of
constitutional hardball's defining characteristics.
61.  Sanford  Levinson,  Why  I  Do Not  Teach Marbury  (Except to Eastern
Europeans) and Why  You  Shouldn't Either, 38  WAKE  FOREST  L.  REV.  553
(2003).
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Federalist  party,  centered  on  Alexander  Hamilton's  ambitious
program  for  creating  a  centralized  commercial  republic  with
strong ties to Great Britain, confronted the Democratic-Republican
party, centered on Thomas Jefferson's vision of a republic of sturdy
and independent yeomen, sympathetic to the spread of republican
sentiment they saw occurring in France.
The  presidential  election  of  1796  saw  the  first  nationally
organized campaigns.  John Adams won a narrow electoral college
victory  over  Jefferson,  with  the  candidates'  support  quite
concentrated  regionally  (Adams' in  the North,  Jefferson's  in  the
South).  Article  II  reflected  the Framers' failure  to anticipate  the
emergence of nationally organized political parties, providing that
the president  would be the person who received  the most votes in
the  electoral  college  and  the  vice-president  the  person  who
received the next highest number of votes."  Article II meant that
Adams became president, Jefferson vice president in  1796.
Partisan  conflict  continued,  exemplified  by  the  Federalists'
enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it an offense to
publish  "false,  scandalous,  and  malicious"  criticisms  of  the
national government,  Congress,  or the president-but not the vice
president-and which was sunsetted so that it expired on March 4,
1801,  the day the president to be elected  in 1800 would take office.
The  candidates  in  the  1800  election  were  Adams  and  Jefferson,
and,  as  historian  Paul  Finkelman  puts  it,  "If  Adams  won
reelection,  he  would  not  need  the law;  and  if Jefferson  won,  he
could not turn the law on Adams's supporters. "'
Article  II's defects in a world of nationally organized political
parties  came  home  to  roost  in  the  election.  The  Democratic-
Republicans  got  more  electoral  votes  than  the  Federalists.  The
problem was  that the members  of the  electoral  college  could not
cast their votes separately for a president and  a vice president.  A
well-organized  party  would  agree  that  all  its  supporters  in  the
electoral  college would cast their votes for the party's presidential
candidate,  and  all  but  one  would  vote  for  the  party's  vice
presidential  candidate.  And,  indeed, that is what the Federalists
did.  The Jeffersonians  were not that well-organized,  though, and
Jefferson  and  his party's  vice  presidential  candidate  Aaron  Burr
received the same number of votes.  The  ambitious Burr saw this
as  an  opportunity  to  become  president  and refused  to  accede  to
pressure that he allow Jefferson to assume the presidency.  That
62.  The  provisions  of Article  II  are  even  more  complicated,  because  they
also  reflected  the Framers' assumption  that it would  be rare  for  the person
with the highest number of votes to have a majority of the electoral  votes  as
well (because,  they  thought, many candidates  would  be  "favorite  sons" with
support only in their home states).
63.  Paul  Finkelman, Election, Presidential, 1800, in 2  ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY  421 (Leonard W. Levy & Louis Fisher eds.,  1994).
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cast the election  to the House  of Representatives,  where the first
play  of constitutional  hardball  occurred.  Adams's  party  saw its
opportunity  in  Burr's  ambition,  and  six  states  with  Federalist
majorities  in their  House  delegations  cast their  votes  for  Burr.
Because  two  states  were  divided  between  Federalists  and
Democratic-Republicans,  Jefferson received only eight votes in the
House, one  short of the required  majority.  After about a week  of
unsuccessful  maneuvering,  the  Federalists  backed  down.  The
Federalist  representatives  in  the  two  divided  states  abstained
from  voting,  giving  their  states'  votes  to  Jefferson,  and  the
Federalists  in  two  states  with  Federalist  majorities  cast  blank
ballots.  Jefferson  thereby  received  ten  votes  and  became
president.  Jefferson's party also became the majority party in the
House and Senate.
The Federalists  may have  acted like  statesmen with respect
to the presidency,  but they were  not done  yet.  The  Constitution
provided  for  quite  a  long  period  between  the  time  when  a  new
president was elected and the time he took office, in this case from
November  1800  to  March  4,  1801.  The  previous  Congress,
dominated  by  Federalists,  and  Adams  remained  in  place,
empowered  to  enact  whatever  laws  they  could.  Pursuing  a
program  of court reform to which they had been committed before
the  election,  the  Federalists  enacted  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1801,
which President Adams signed on February 13.  The Act abolished
the existing circuit  courts, which consisted  of a district judge and
two Supreme  Court justices, and created  six new circuit  courts in
their place, with new positions  for sixteen circuit judges.  The Act
also  reduced  the  number  of Supreme  Court justices  from  six  to
five, to  take  effect  as  soon  as  a sitting justice left  office.  It  also
substantially increased the scope of federal jurisdiction, consistent
with  the  Federalists' centralizing  program.  Some  aspects  of the
1801 Judiciary  Act, particularly the  abolition of the duty imposed
by the original Judiciary Act of 1789 on Supreme Court justices to
sit  on  circuit  courts,  were  sensible  reforms.  But,  the  political
context  meant  that  most  of the  Act's  provisions  were  seen  by
Jeffersonians  as an attempt by Federalists  to entrench themselves
in the courts as they were forced to depart from the presidency and
control  of Congress.  To  Jeffersonians,  that is, the  1801  Act was
constitutional hardball.
Jeffersonians  responded  in  kind.  Once  they  controlled
Congress  and  the  presidency,  they  repealed  the  1801  Act.  The
Judiciary  Act  of  1802  abolished  the  new  circuit  courts.
Jeffersonians  knew  that  the  repeal  was  constitutionally
questionable.  True, Article  III vested  the nation's judicial power
in the Supreme Court "and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
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may from time to time ordain and establish."6  But, abolishing the
circuit  courts  meant  eliminating  the  new  circuit  judges,  which
might have been taken to violate the Constitution's guarantee that
federal judges hold office "during good Behavior."6  Concerned that
the  Supreme Court might  agree  that eliminating  the  new  courts
was  unconstitutional,  Jeffersonians  enacted  another  statute that
postponed  the Supreme  Court's next term, hoping that, the circuit
judges having been out of office (or at least out of money) for a year
or  more,  the  issue  would  have  faded  by  the  time  the  Court
considered the 1802 Act's constitutionality.'
The big fights in  1801 and  1802 were thus over statutes that
substantially reorganized  the federal judiciary.  Marbury involved
another  statute  entirely,  enacted  two  weeks  after  the  1801
Judiciary Act, which created  forty-two positions  for justices of the
peace  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  President  Adams  and  the
Senate  rushed  through  nominations  and  confirmations,  and
Adams signed  the commissions for all the new magistrates.  As  I
have  noted,  the  nation's  government  was  still  young  and,
importantly,  small.  The  Secretary  of State,  in  addition  to  his
duties  in  foreign  affairs,  was  given  the  duty  to  transmit
commissions  to federal  officials;  it  made sense for him to do so for
ambassadors,  after  all,  and  why  duplicate  bureaucracies  for
judicial appointments?  John Marshall became Adams's  Secretary
of State  in  May  1800.  He  was  nominated  for  Chief Justice  on
January  20,  1801-after  Jefferson's  election,  of  course-and
confirmed  by  the  Senate  on  January  27.  Roughly  six  weeks
remained  before  Jefferson  took office,  and  Marshall  continued  to
serve as Secretary of State for a brief period even after he took the
oath of  office  as  Chief Justice.67  He  put  the  seal  of the  United
States on  the commissions  and  started shipping  them out.  Four
remained  undelivered  on  the  morning  of  March  4,  1801,  when
Marshall left the office  to swear Jefferson  in as president.  James
Madison,  the  new  Secretary  of State,  found  the  commissions  on
64.  U.S. CONST. art. III, §  1.
65.  Id.
66.  Even  the  postponement  of  the  Court's  term,  of  course,  was
constitutional  hardball,  because  there  were  substantial  arguments  that
Congress  lacks  the power to control the  details of administration within  the
judicial  branch.  The  Supreme  Court  acceded  to  Congress's  direction  and
postponed  its  term.  In  itself, that  action  did  not confirm  Congress's  power,
because  the  Court's  action  could  be  interpreted  as  a  decision  taken  by  the
Court itself, informed by and consonant  with Congress's  views but not-from
the Court's point of view-an action compelled by Congress.
67.  I  do  not  believe  Marshall's  dual  office  holding  is  an  example  of
constitutional  hardball.  Jefferson  asked that Marshall stay on as Secretary of
State.  See R. KENT NEWMYER,  JOHN  MARSHALL  AND THE HEROIC AGE  OF THE
SUPREME  COURT  141  (2001)  (referring to Jefferson's  request).  In any event,
the  rudimentary  structure  of  the  national  government  required  more
flexibility in  staffing national offices than we have come to think appropriate.
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the desk when he arrived on March 5.  Jefferson  directed that the
commissions be withheld.  Marbury v. Madison ensued.
The stakes are high in constitutional hardball.  The Judiciary
Acts  of  1801  and  1802  were  episodes  of constitutional  hardball
because  the  stakes  there  were  the  control  of  the  national
government as a whole.  If the Jeffersonians  prevailed, they would
have  control  over all three  branches  of the national  government,
while  if the Federalists did, the Federalists would have a foothold
in the judiciary, which they could use to constrain what Congress
and,  especially,  the  president  did.  Marbury was  constitutional
hardball too,  not because the statute creating justices  of peace  in
the District of Columbia had any real  importance,  but because  it
raised the question of whether the Federalists would be able to use
their  control  of  the  judiciary  to  discipline  Congress  and  the
president.
Indeed, the question in Marbury was even more refined.  The
power of the federal courts to enforce constitutional limitations  on
congressional  power was  essentially unquestioned  when Marbury
was  decided.  Two  things  were  contested,  though,  and  Marbury
brought them together.  The courts could invalidate congressional
legislation  when  a  constitutional  question  was  brought  before
them in a proper case.  So, for example, the courts  could refuse to
enforce  a criminal statute that was, in their view, unconstitutional
because,  by  implicating  the  courts  in  enforcement,  Congress
necessarily  acceded  to  giving  the  courts  the  last  word  on
constitutionality.  The  first  contested  question  was,  where
Congress  acted  on its own,  that  is,  did not  call on  the courts  for
assistance  in  implementing  public  policy,  could  the  courts
somehow  find  Congress's  actions  unconstitutional?  The  second
contested  question  distinguished  Congress  from  the  presidency.
Assuming  that  the  courts  can  hold  federal  statutes
unconstitutional, could they find executive actions taken pursuant
to  statutory law-actions that were not  ultra vires the statutes-
but  not  compelled  by  statute  unlawful  and  therefore  subject  to
judicial control?
Jefferson's  refusal  to  deliver  Marbury's  commission  raised
both contested  questions.  In the ordinary course,  courts were not
involved  in  delivering  or  withholding  commissions.  And,
obviously,  no  statute  compelled  Jefferson's  decision.  Marshall
played hardball  in Marbury by resolving both contested questions
in  a  way  that  allowed  the  (Federalist-dominated)  courts  to  be
continuing supervisors  of the actions  taken  by  the (Jeffersonian-
dominated) Congress  and presidency.  He did so by construing the
federal  statutes  defining  the  federal  courts'  jurisdiction  to
authorize  the  federal  courts  to issue  writs  of mandamus  to  high
executive  officials,  where  the  courts  concluded  that the  statutes
regulating the officials' actions limited their discretion.
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Marshall's  move has  a certain  brilliance to  it.  On its face, a
mandamus proceeding differs from  a criminal prosecution  because
in  the  latter  the  government-the  executive,  authorized  by
Congress-comes  to the courts and asks for their help, whereas  in
the  former  a  private  party  asks  the  court  to  help  him  or  her
against an  executive  official.  Marshall's  move  was to  assimilate
the  two  cases  by  saying  that  in both  Congress  has  authorized
someone to ask the courts  for help, and having done so allows the
courts  to  supervise  what  Congress  and  executive  officials  have
done.  Judicial  review  for  constitutionality  in  appropriate  cases
was uncontroversial  in the early 1800s, but judicial supremacy in
constitutional  interpretation  was.  By  creating  a  jurisdictional
regime  in which  private  parties  could  bring federal officials  into
court, Marshall  moved far in the direction  of establishing judicial
supremacy.
Marbury itself was  an  episode  of constitutional  hardball  for
many reasons.  The logic of Marshall's opinion is, as every student
of the  case  knows,  hardly  iron-clad.  Yet,  like  all  examples  of
constitutional  hardball,  the  arguments  Marshall  made,  while
perhaps  strained, were  at no point frivolous.  Marshall made the
stakes  high by treating the  case  as one implicating  the power  of
the courts, the last bastion of Federalist  control, to supervise the
other  branches,  controlled  by  Jeffersonians.  And,  of  course,
Marshall managed  to establish the power of the courts to control
the  other  branches  in  a  decision  that  made  it  impossible  for
Jefferson to fight back directly.  Marshall ended up saying that the
courts  had  the power  to  impose  the Constitution's  disciplines  on
the president without actually doing so on Marbury's behalf.
Yet, it  remains  an  open  question whether  Marshall actually
succeeded  in  the  short-  to  medium-run.  Of  course  Marbury is
taken  to establish  the power of judicial  review, but no one really
disputed  that.  What  Marshall  wanted,  as  a  player  of
constitutional hardball,  was to discipline  the Jeffersonians.  But,
the Jeffersonians  and their successors, the Jacksonian Democrats,
controlled  national  policy-making  for  decades  after  1803.
Marshall remained on the Court until 1835,  and during his tenure
the  Court  never  held  unconstitutional  any  federal  statute
important to the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian  program."
68.  Far, but not all the way.  Even  on Marshall's  analysis,  Congress could
insulate its programs from constitutional supervision by the courts if it figured
out  some  way  to  eliminate  the  possibility  of a  private  party's offensive  suit
against the government-eliminating the writ of mandamus in a class of cases,
for example (although doing so might be quite difficult, in light of the ability of
a recalcitrant judiciary to construe the jurisdictional statutes creatively).
69.  It  is  not  even  clear  to  me  that the  Marshall  Court's  invalidations  of
state  laws,  some of which  were  part of Democratic initiatives,  were  all that
important either.  For an analysis, see Michael  Klarman, How Great Were the
"Great"  Marshall  Court Decisions?,  87 VA.  L. REV.  1111 (2001).
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IV. ELABORATIONS:  BRUSHBACKS  AND  FAILURES
I  have  described  constitutional hardball  as a  symptom  of the
possibility  of  a  shift  in  the  governing  assumptions  of  a
constitutional  order.  Political  leaders  play  hardball  when  they
believe  that  they  are  in  a  position  to  shift  from  one  order  to
another,  or when  they believe themselves  to  be  threatened  with
the  possibility  of  such  a  shift.  But,  we  might  observe
constitutional  hardball in  a  number  of variants because initiating
hardball depends on perceptions by political leaders of possibilities,
and not on some objectively ascertainable conditions.
A.  The First Variant:  Brushbacks
Franklin  D.  Roosevelt's  court-packing  plan  of  1937  is  an
example  of what we could call the brushback. Roosevelt proposed
to  expand  the  size  of  the  Supreme  Court,  nominally  to  provide
elderly justices with assistance in  performing the Court's work by
allowing them to  spread the workload  across  a  larger Court with
younger members.  Everyone knew, though, that this rationale for
expanding the  Court was  not the  real  one.  Roosevelt  wanted  to
expand the Court so that he could appoint enough new members to
guarantee  that  New  Deal  programs,  subject  to  non-trivial
constitutional  challenges  under  then-existing  doctrine,  would  be
upheld as constitutional.
The  court-packing  plan  satisfies  the conditions  I  have  given
for constitutional  hardball.  Nothing in  the Constitution expressly
limits  the  power  of the  political  branches  to set  the  size  of the
Supreme  Court.  Perhaps  we  might  devise  an  argument  that
changes  in  the size  of the  Court  are  constitutionally  permissible
only when they are motivated  by policy concerns about the Court's
efficient operation,0  but even  if  we  did it  would remain true that
the  court-packing  plan  was  constitutionally  defensible  within
70.  There  would be  difficulty  both in doing so generally,  and applying any
such  criterion  to  the  court-packing  plan  itself.  Prior  to  the  New  Deal the
political  branches  had adjusted  the  Court's  size  because  of purely  political
considerations, shrinking its size as vacancies  occurred  during the presidency
of Andrew  Johnson  and  expanding  it once  Johnson  left  office.  Moreover,
Roosevelt's  stated rationale  for the  plan would  satisfy any requirement  that
expansions  be justified by public policy concerns.  It could be attacked  only if
we  had  a  robust  doctrine  allowing  challenges  to  statutes  whose  stated
rationales,  while  acceptable  in  themselves,  are  pretexts  for  impermissible
goals.  But, although  the  Court  has  stated  such  a  doctrine,  the  doctrine  is
hardly robust.  See, e.g., McCulloch  v. Maryland,  17  U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  316,  423
(1819) (stating  'should  Congress,  under  the pretext of executing  its  powers,
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government[,]
it would become  the painful duty of this tribunal ....  to say that such  an act
was not  the law  of the  land");  Bailey  v.  Drexel  Furniture  Co.,  259  U.S.  20
(1922)  (relying on the "pretext" doctrine to invalidate  the federal  Child Labor
Tax Act).
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existing doctrine.  But, of course, the plan was inconsistent with a
pre-constitutional  understanding that the Court's  size  should  not
be  manipulated  for  merely  political  purposes,  and,  particularly,
simply  to  guarantee  that  a  reconstituted  Court  would  reach
politically  desirable results.  And, finally, Roosevelt  proposed  the
plan because he believed that he was in position  to bring about a
constitutional transformation.
What  is  interesting  about  the  Court-packing  plan  is  that,
while  Roosevelt's  belief  about  the  prospect  of  constitutional
transformation  was  (or turned  out to  be) correct,  the  plan itself
failed.  The  conventional  story, though, is that the  Court-packing
plan brought about the transformation, as the Court's majority-or,
more  precisely,  Justice  Owen  Roberts-changed  its  views  in
reaction  to  the  threat  the  plan  posed.  Recent  scholarship  has
persuasively  challenged that story in its most pristine  form,'  but
that  challenge  is  irrelevant  here.  The  Court-packing  plan
illustrates the possibility that an episode of constitutional hardball
can  produce  constitutional  transformation  by  intimidating  the
political  opposition.  That  is why  I  call  the  possibility  one  of a
brushback, which in baseball is a pitch designed to intimidate the
batter.
B.  A Second Variant: Failures
The  brushback  shows  that  particular  instances  of
constitutional  hardball  can  fail  in  the  small  but  succeed  in the
large." 2  There  is another  interesting  category,  where  a political
actor plays constitutional hardball and simply fails.
Some examples of failed constitutional hardball are these.  (1)
In  the  late  1960s  Richard  Nixon  attempted  to  impound  money
Congress had  appropriated  for  specific  purposes, arguing that as
president he had a constitutional obligation to control spending in
the  service  of  the  macroeconomic  goal  of controlling  inflation.
Again, the conditions for constitutional  hardball existed.  Nixon's
constitutional  claims  were  something  of a  stretch  under existing
doctrine, 3  but  they  were  not  frivolous.  The  prevailing  pre-
constitutional  understanding, though, was that the president had
to  spend  what  Congress  appropriated,  because  there  was
71.  See CUSHMAN, supra note 48, at 33.
72.  I  think  it  plausible  to  treat  the  impeachment  of  Bill  Clinton  as  a
brushback, which achieved  its effect  not in  the removal of Clinton from office,
but in  weakening the political position of the presidential  Democratic party in
the 2000 presidential elections.
73.  I  believe  that  the  scholarly  consensus  is  that  Nixon's  claim  of
presidential  authority  was  not  well-founded.  See  Philip  B.  Kurland,
Impoundment of Funds in  2  ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF THE AMERICAN  CONSTITUTION
967 (Leonard  W. Levy  ed.,  1986) (noting "Where  Congress has  mandated the
expenditure of funds in  support of a legislative program, the President has no
choice but to effectuate  Congress's will").
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something  distasteful  about  a president  signing  legislation  with
his fingers crossed, that is, with the thought that, no matter what
the  legislation  said,  the  president  could  later  decide  against
complying  with  it.  Finally,  Nixon's  effort  was  part  of a  more
general  strategy among Republicans to wrest control over national
policy  from  the  Democrats  who  dominated  Congress.  The
strategy,  for  present  purposes,  had  two  components.  The
Republican  party's  electoral  strategy  was  to  increase  its
representation  in  the  South, gaining  enough  seats  there  to take
control of Congress.  Its constitutional strategy was to shift power
in  the  national  government  from  Congress,  while  it  remained
under Democratic  control, to the presidency and the states, which
Republicans  could at least occasionally  control.  The only problem,
of  course,  was  that Nixon  failed  to  transform  the  constitutional
order. 74  He  believed that  he was  in  a  position  to  do  so,  but his
analysis was wrong.
(2)  A decade  and  a half later, facing  a judiciary that he  and
his administration  believed controlled by its political opponents  on
substantive  issues  crucial  to  the administration's  transformative
agenda,  Attorney  General  Edwin  Meese  asserted  the president's
right,  under the  Constitution,  to  advance  his  own  constitutional
views  even  in the  face  of contrary  declarations  by  the  Supreme
Court." 5  Meese's  position was  not  constitutionally  frivolous." 6  It
generated  enormous  controversy,  though, 77  because  it  was
inconsistent  with settled  understandings  about  the supremacy  of
the  Court's  constitutional  interpretations.  And,  once  again,  the
Reagan  administration  may  have  initiated  a  constitutional
transformation,  as I believe,"  or it  may merely have attempted to
do  so,  as  its  supporters  believe,  but  it  did  not  complete  the
transformation or, on other views, even succeed in starting one.
(3)  In  the  1830s  Andrew  Jackson's  political  opponents
believed  they had an opportunity  to  push the Jacksonians  out of
power.  The Federalist  party had disintegrated in the  1810s,  and
the Jeffersonians  had been transformed  by Jackson's  presidency.
Henry  Clay,  among  others,  thought  that it  might  be  possible  to
revive something like the Federalist party.  The Jacksonians  were
strongly  opposed to the  Bank of the United States, believing it  to
74.  My view  is that it took  Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich, assisted by
Bill Clinton, to do that.  See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 9-11.  But, even if I am
wrong in  my  claim that a  new constitutional  order has come  into being, the
point about Nixon's failure remains accurate.
75.  Edwin Meese, The Law of  the Constitution,  61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987).
76.  Indeed,  I  believe  it to  be  correct.  See  Mark  Tushnet,  The  Supreme
Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney General Meese: A Comment,
61 TUL. L. REV.  1017 (1987).
77.  For illustrations, see  Symposium, Perspectives  on the Authoritativeness
of Supreme Court  Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 977 (1987).
78.  See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 9.
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be a tool by which moneyed elites oppressed ordinary people.  Clay
pushed  a  bill  rechartering  the  Bank  through  Congress  several
years  before  necessary,  to  create  an  issue  on which  he  and  his
political allies  could go to the country  in the presidential  election
of 1832.  Jackson  thereupon  vetoed  the  rechartering.  Jackson's
veto relied on a combination of policy-based objections  to the Bank
and  an  argument  against  its  constitutionality,  notwithstanding
the  Supreme  Court's  decision  otherwise  in  McCulloch  v.
Maryland.9  Jackson decisively  won the 1832  election, and  Clay's
party, eventually  known as the Whigs,  did not gain control  of the
government until more than a decade later.
The bank-recharter episode fits my definition of constitutional
hardball.  Obviously,  the  timing  of  the  Bank's  renewal  was
entirely within  Congress's  constitutional  power, and yet  enacting
legislation  several years before it has  any effect is in tension with
ordinary  practices.  The  president  arguably  has  the  bare
constitutional  authority  to  veto  legislation  on  any  ground
whatever,  and yet  Jackson's  veto  message  was  inconsistent with
the  usual  understandings  about  the veto  power  in two  ways.  It
invoked  policy  grounds,  whereas  prior  presidents  had  a  strong
though  not  uniform  record  of  vetoing  legislation  only  on
constitutional  grounds. °  In  addition,  the  constitutional  reasons
Jackson  provided  had been  rejected  by  the  Supreme  Court,  and
asserting  a  constitutional  ground  in  the  face  of  a  contrary
Supreme Court decision was, again, unusual at the time.
The examples  of impoundment under Nixon, Meese's position
on the president's authority to interpret the Constitution, and the
bank recharter controversy  show that constitutional hardball  can
fail.  Political actors play constitutional hardball when they believe
that a  shift  in  constitutional  orders  is  possible.  They  fail  when
that belief turns out to be mistaken.
C.  Do Failures  Show That Constitutional  Hardball  Is Not
Extraordinary?
The possibility of failure, though, might suggest that the very
concept of constitutional hardball is not that useful.  The difficulty
is that the possibility of failure  means that political actors  might
play constitutional hardball all the time.  If they  do,  the concept
fails  to  differentiate  between  ordinary  forms  of  politics  and
extraordinary  ones, and yet doing so is precisely what the concept
is designed for.
Here  the role of perception and belief, and the willingness  to
79.  For  the  veto  message,  see  Andrew  Jackson,  Veto  Message,  in  2
MESSAGES  AND  PAPERS  OF  THE  PRESIDENTS  576  (James  D.  Richardson  ed.,
1900).
80.  On  veto  practices,  see  LOuIS  FISHER,  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONFLICTS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT  141-47 (1985).
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act  on perceptions  and beliefs,  matters  a  great deal.  The testing
case  would  be  whether  we  could  identify  periods  during  which
political leaders of the party out of power did not believe that they
were  in  a  position  to  transform  the  constitutional  order  and
permanently  regain  power  in  a  transformed  order.  In  these
periods  political  leaders  believe  the  existing  order  to  be  quite
stable." 1  During  them,  we  would  expect  to  see  the  opposition's
political  leaders  accepting  the  existing  order's  institutions  and
organizing principles, and claiming only that they would be better
at running  those institutions  and  implementing  those  principles
than the current incumbents.  And, we would not expect to see the
opposition's leaders trying to play constitutional hardball.
Fortunately  for me,  I think there  are such  periods, and that
the  concept  of  constitutional  hardball  therefore  retains  some
utility.  The  presidential  campaigns  of  1952  and  1960  are  the
easiest examples  I  can offer.  In both the Republican  presidential
candidates  accepted the principles  of the New Deal constitutional
order.  The  contrast between  the campaigns  of Richard  Nixon in
1960  and  1968  is  particularly  instructive  here.  In  1960  Nixon
presented  his  program  as  more  of  the  same-more  of  the
competent  administration  of  New  Deal  programs  that  Dwight
Eisenhower's  presidency  had provided.  The  1968 campaign  was
different.  Nixon  was influenced  by Barry Goldwater's  contention
that the American people  deserved  a choice,  not an echo,8 2  and by
his own understanding that he  had to at least co-opt  Goldwater's
supporters  if he  was  to  win  the party's  nomination.  Nixon  also
concluded  that the decaying  of the  New Deal  coalition under  the
pressure  of  the  civil  rights  movement  and  the  Vietnam  War
provided an opportunity for a real shift in the constitutional  order.
His  successful  1968  campaign  put  the  possibility  of  dramatic
change on the political table.83
81.  I  have  considered  whether  I  ought  to  add another  criterion,  that the
existing  order  actually  be  stable  during  these  periods,  and  in  the  end
concluded  that  I  should  not.  I  am  not  sure  we  could  identify  criteria,
independent  of the judgment  of political  leaders,  to  identify  "true" stability.
And, in any event, political leaders out of power have a strong incentive to act
on beliefs that a transformation  is possible, if they hold them.  So,  the beliefs
political  leaders hold  will almost  certainly  be  a good  proxy  for true stability
anyway.
82.  The  slogan  Goldwater  supporter  Phyllis  Schlafly  used  to  describe  his
candidacy in a 1964 campaign publication.  PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY,  A CHOICE  NOT
AN ECHO (1964).
83.  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  Nixon  campaigned  openly  on  the
possibility of constitutional  transformation (except perhaps with respect to the
roles  of Congress  and the president in determining national  domestic  policy),
but  only  that  his  victory  opened  up  possibilities  that  Nixon  understood,
because  he  had  had  to  accommodate  himself  to  the  increasingly  powerful
Goldwater  conservatives  in  the  Republican  party.  After  his  election  he
acknowledged  this  accommodation,  and  its  implications  for  basic
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Putting  this  analysis  in  the  terms  I  have  developed,  Nixon
believed  in  1968  that  there  was  a  possibility  of  constitutional
transformation,  and  therefore  began  to  play  constitutional
hardball.  As  it happened, Nixon misjudged either the situation or
his  own  ability  to  win  at  constitutional  hardball.  But,  the
difference  between  his  1960  and  1968  campaigns  shows  that
constitutional  hardball  need  not  be  the  ordinary  condition  of
politics.
Yet,  the  concept  of  constitutional  hardball  does  seem  to
describe a lot of recent, that is, post-1980,  political practices.  The
reason,  I  believe,  that  that  we  have  been  experiencing  a  quite
extended  period  of constitutional  transformation.  Consider  how
things  would  look  if  we  combined  my  idea  of  constitutional
hardball with the descriptive portion of Bruce Ackerman's account
of  constitutional  moments.  In  my  terms,  Ackerman's
constitutional moments are concentrated  periods during which our
constitutional  order shifts rapidly from  one  form  to another.  We
would then expect to see constitutional hardball in the brief period
surrounding  a  constitutional  moment-just  before  it,  as  pre-
constitutional  assumptions  are  brought  into  question,  and  just
after it,  as new  pre-constitutional  assumptions  are  put in  place.
And  then,  during  the  extended  periods  of what  Ackerman  calls
ordinary  politics,  we  would  observe  ordinary  constitutional
politics,  that  is,  policy  initiatives  that  might  raise  ordinary
constitutional  questions  without  challenging  settled  pre-
constitutional assumptions.
The  picture  is different  if constitutional  transformation  can
take place  over an extended period,  as I believe  it may have been
since  around  1980.'  Then we would  observe  an equally extended
period  in  which  political  leaders  played  constitutional  hardball.
Indeed, it might come to seem as if constitutional hardball was the
normal state  of things rather than a symptom  of the possibility of
constitutional transformation.  Transformation might seem like an
ever-receding  light  at the  end  of the  tunnel,  and  constitutional
hardball the way politicians play day-to-day politics.
V.  SOME POSSIBLE NORMATIVE  IMPLICATIONS
So  far  I  have  tried  to  keep  my  analysis  as  descriptive  as
possible.  Still, I suspect that most readers are likely to think that
there  is something  distasteful  about constitutional  hardball  as  a
constitutional  understandings,  by  ceding  large  parts  of  the  Department  of
Justice to Goldwater conservatives.
84.  See generally  TUSHNET, supra  note 1, where I argue that our present set
of fundamental arrangements deserve to be described as a constitutional order
but acknowledge  the  cogency of claims that what  we are  experiencing  is an
extended transitional period.
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process.85  After  all,  playing  for keeps  in  politics  is,  it  might  be
thought,  a  recipe  for  social  disaster,  leading  at  the  extreme  to
genocide  and  annihilation  of  the  enemy."  Even  short  of that,
constitutional  hardball  might  lead  to  unpleasant  personal
relations  among  politically  active  people.  And,  as  L.  Michael
Seidman  has emphasized,  playing  for keeps  might  be wrong just
because  it  fails to acknowledge  the possibility that one's  political-
constitutional  opponents  might  actually  be  right  about  the
Constitution-a  possibility  that,  according  to  Seidman,  is  ever-
present. 87
Note, though, that some of these normative questions are not
about constitutional hardball in itself, but are about what happens
when  someone  wins the  game.  Consider, for example,  the  sheer
distastefulness  of constitutional  hardball.  That  problem  could be
eliminated  after  constitutional  transformation  occurs-after,  that
is,  we  emerge  from the tunnel into  the new  constitutional  order.
Then, the politicians  having control of the government  can revert
to  ordinary  constitutional  politics,  and  their opponents  can,  like
Eisenhower  and  Nixon  in  1960,  play  the game  on  the  winners'
terms,  hoping  to  pick  up  a  victory  or  two  themselves.  If  our
normative  misgivings  are  founded  in  simple  distaste  for
constitutional  hardball,  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  politicians
have been playing it for more than twenty years now, we can take
solace in the possibility that someday the Republicans  might win.'
The normative problems associated with playing for keeps are
different.  The solutions  to those normative  problems  are usually
apparent.  In its  most general  form,  the solution  is  for  political-
constitutional  actors  to behave  like  grown-ups.  So,  for example,
the  solution  to  the  problem  created  by  the  tie  vote  in  the  2000
presidential  election-one  that  would  be  obvious  in  other
democratic  constitutional  systems-would  have  been  the
negotiation  of  a  coalition  government,  with  some  agreement,
perhaps  memorialized  in  a  coalition  document,  about  which
Cabinet  offices  each  party  would  control,  with  assurances  that,
85.  If not about any particular examples I have used.  Again, the problem of
perspective  intervenes.  I suspect that people are likely to view what I describe
as  instances  of  constitutional  hardball  as  entirely  sensible  legal-political
strategies when conducted by the side they  favor, and as distasteful hardball
only when conducted by the other side.
86.  That certainly is the practical  implication that the German  (and Nazi)
legal  theorist  Carl  Schmitt  drew  from  his  analysis  of  politics  as  combat
between enemies.
87.  Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN,  OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION  (2001).
88.  Or, less likely, that Republicans  come to accept  the fact-if it is one-
that their  prospects  of complete  victory  are slim,  and so  come  to  accept the
small victories  and  small  losses that I  argue  elsewhere  are  characteristic  of
the  present  constitutional  order  (which  should  not  be  understood  as  an
extended period of transition).
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taken as a whole, the portfolios of the Democrats and Republicans
would  be  roughly  equivalent  in  social  and  political  importance.
Similarly, the mature  solution to the problem of polarizing judicial
nominations  followed  by  filibusters  is  an  agreement  by  the
president  not  to  submit  nominations  about  which  a substantial
number  of  Senators  have  deep  reservations,  coupled  with  an
agreement  by  Senators  to  confirm  all  nominees  who  clear  this
vetting process.89
The problem,  then,  does not lie in  identifying  outcomes  that
avoid  the  perils  of  constitutional  hardball.  Rather,  it  lies  in
reaching those  outcomes  through  the ordinary  means  of politics.
Several inadequate possibilities deserve mention.
First,  we  could  simply  hope  that,  once  the  systemic
phenomenon  of  constitutional  hardball  is  identified  and  named,
political actors will decide not to play the game.  They will give up
the aspiration  to  achieve total victory over their opponents.  This
is  a  possibility  I  have  identified  elsewhere  as  nattering  by
constitutional  theorists-identifying  normatively  attractive
solutions to real problems  and hoping that their sheer normative
attractiveness will induce  political actors  to adopt them.'  As my
label for the hope suggests, this does not seem to me a promising
strategy.
Second,  we  could  hope  that  political  actors  will  in  fact  be
sufficiently  mature  to adopt  the obvious  solutions.  In  Madison's
terms,  we  could  hope  that  our  political  leaders  would  be
"enlightened statesmen."9'  But, as Madison immediately observed,
"enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.'  And, our
contemporary  circumstances  suggest  that enlightened  statesmen
might never be at the helm.  The reason lies in the structure of our
present  party  system.'  For  structural  reasons  that  system
produces  highly  partisan  and  ideologically  polarized  political
leaders.  Simplifying  a  complex  reality:  each  party  selects  its
89.  Reaching such  an agreement  would  require each  side  to forgo making
strong  claims  about  the  constitutional  prerogatives  of  the  president  (to
nominate whoever he deems fit for office) and the Senate (to refuse to confirm
nominees  on  whatever  grounds  a  sufficient  number  of  Senators  deem
appropriate).  For  an  interesting  example  of a  failed  compromise  over the
composition  of  the  federal  judiciary,  see  Gillman,  supra  note  30,  at  8-9
(describing  attempts  by  Republican  Attorney  General  Herbert  Brownell  to
achieve a  compromise with  Senate Democrats over  increasing the  number of
federal judges and allocating appointments by party).
90.  MARK  TUSHNET,  TAKING  THE  CONSTITUTION  AWAY  FROM  THE  COURTS
155 (1999).  "A lot of scholarly writing about the Supreme  Court...  seems to
assume that  if academics  and journalists  natter at the justices  long  enough,
they will wake up and see the light we are offering them."  Id.
91.  THE FEDERALIST No.  10 (James Madison).
92.  Id.
93.  Madison  of  course  did  not  anticipate  the  emergence  of  nationally
organized parties, much less the particular party system we have today.
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candidates  in a party primary in which the voters are drawn from
the party's  more ideologically  extreme wing.  Elections then pit a
quite  conservative  Republican  against  a  quite  liberal  Democrat.
In the aggregate, we end up with a House of Representatives  and a
Senate in which there is, for all practical purposes, no center.  The
partisans  we  elect  are  then  inclined  to  play  constitutional
hardball-or, at least, are unlikely to be enlightened  statesmen in
the required sense.
Third, we might hope that political actors will realize that the
worm will turn someday.  That is, they might correctly believe that
by playing constitutional  hardball today they may be able to take
control of all the levers of governing power, but they might realize
that  someday  their opponents  will  seize  the  opportunity  to  play
constitutional hardball in return, gain power, and shut them out of
power.  The  problem  here  is  with  the  time-horizon  of  political
actors.  They will not care if the worm turns after their politically
active  lives are over-after they die, retire,  or assume  the role of
elder  statesman  or -woman.  And,  if history is  a  guide,  the  life
span  of a constitutional  order  is longer than  the time-horizon  of
most active  political  actors.  I  would  not want to be held  to  the
following  judgments,  but  consider  the  possibility  that  the
Jeffersonian-Jacksonian  order  lasted  from  around  1801  to
somewhere  in  the  late  1840s  or  early  1850s,  that  the  post-
Reconstruction order lasted from around  1876 to somewhere in the
1930s, and that the New Deal-Great Society order lasted from the
mid-1930s  to  the  mid-1970s.  At  every  point the  remaining  life
span of each constitutional order is longer than the time horizon of
almost every political actor-with the exception of the time when a
constitutional order is visibly in decay, which is precisely when the
political  opposition  will  see  the  advantages  of starting  to  play
hardball and the dominant party will play hardball to shore up its
decaying foundations.
Are  there  any  ways  that  politics  might  produce  politicians
who refuse to play constitutional hardball?  The answer, I suspect,
lies  in breaking  out  of the confines  of conventional  politics.  The
dynamics  I have described occur because the two major parties are
ideologically  polarized.  One  institutional  solution  would  be  the
creation  of  a  third  party,  an  energized  center. 94  Because  the
emergence  of such  a party  seems  extremely  unlikely, 95  I  suspect
94.  For a moment, it seemed  as if the Reform Party might play such a role.
Jesse  Ventura's  decision  to  refrain  from  running  for  re-election  (with the
possibility  of a later  campaign  for  the presidency)  seems  to have  eliminated
that possibility.
95.  The  Supreme  Court's  decision  in Timmons  v. Twin  Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S.  351 (1997),  eliminated one promising method by which such a
third party might have  emerged.  And,  more  generally,  the Court's decisions
on  political  parties  have  increasingly  endorsed  the  two-party  system,
[37:523Constitutional  Hardball
that we  are  going  to experience  constitutional  hardball  until the
Republican  party  establishes  its  dominance  in  all  branches,  or
until its leaders  realize  that they  are  not likely  to  do  so  in the
foreseeable future.
justifying state  laws that protect the  duopoly.  For a discussion,  see Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard  H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan  Lockups of the
Democratic  Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
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